As I've gotten older, I find myself questioning authority figures less. For example I read something from the New York Times a couple of years ago that argued Ken Lay didn't realize just how bad Enron was in the summer of 2001 and for whatever reasons I found it credible. Tonight was one of those nights though where Tony La Russa tests the faith of saints. In the top of the 6th with Kevin Jarvis struggling, La Russa elected to let Jarvis pitch to Hee Seop Choi, and Choi hit a weak slider 400+ feet for a three-run homer.

I'm not so much interested in ripping in La Russa as I am in figuring out what he was thinking. This is Kevin Jarvis, with a career ERA around 6.00 and a career ERA+ in the low 70's. He's demonstrated that he's a bad pitcher. Randy Flores had been warming up and was ready, and both Choi and JD Drew, the guy on deck, are dangerous lefties. The Cardinals recognized the risk, as Dave Duncan went to the mound to talk to Jarvis right before the Choi homer (I'd swear opposing batters hit like Albert Pujols following mound visits). So what was he thinking? I've come up with a list of possibilities that aren't mutually exclusive:

(1) Kevin Jarvis needs some confidence. La Russa stated back in 2003 that he believed players play their best when they think management trusts them. La Russa's got over 2000 wins and a degree in industrial management, so he should know what he's talking about, but votes of confidence didn't solve Esteban Yan's problems. Similarly...

(2) It's a long season, and La Russa's willing to risk a game to find out what he's got in Jarvis. Or to give Jarvis a fair chance or some other variation. That's where stats are useful though. I know Jarvis had a good month at AAA, but even Jeff Fassero had a good month and a half in 2002. You should have a pretty good idea what you're getting in advance. The alternate to this is...

(3) La Russa wants the front office to know what they've got in the bullpen so they'll go out and fix the problem. I doubt La Russa would do that, but 2003 made me wonder at times.

(4) The pitcher's spot was due up first in the next half inning. Note that Wilson Alvarez picked up the win by getting one batter out in the 5th before getting pulled for a pinch hitter. La Russa may have felt he didn't have the same luxury of a one-out lefty that early (by the way the Dodgers have a nice-looking pen even without Gagne; also Morris's relapse tonight put the team in this position in the first place). On the other hand letting Flores hit for himself with a two-run lead is better than letting Roger Cedeño hit with a one-run deficit.

(5) Right-handed batting Olmedo Saenz was available. This is the most likely explanation, and it's what Joe Buck suggested. Maybe I hang with the wrong people, but I don't mind getting Choi out of the game in the 6th for Saenz. But that leads to...

(6) La Russa and Duncan buy into the "Choi's soft" stuff. Or he's got holes in his swing or whatever. La Russa wouldn't be the only one to feel this way. Even if you're not a big fan of minor league numbers or Baseball America's prospect rankings, they're sound reasons to respect Choi. Maybe you let your good pitchers experiment with him, but not your #7 reliever with two runners on and a two-run lead.

Obviously I'm not satisfied with my potential answers. So I'll keep looking. One unrelated note: Albert Pujols is 0 for 18 with four walks in "Close and Late" situations this year. Sample size yadda yadda yadda, but he might be pressing. In the 8th after Larry Walker worked an 0-2 count into a walk, Pujols tried to pull the first pitch he saw, a pitch that looked to be on the outer half of the plate. The result was a predictable 6-4-3.